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where individual property rights were well defined.  Second, we show that well-defined property rights
in Korea and Taiwan secured land taxation and enabled farmers to obtain bank loans for capital improvements,
principally irrigation systems.   Our analytical model predicts that high costs of creating an ownership
updating system and a citizen identity system discourage a short-sighted government from implementing
these crucial components, the absence of which gradually makes land registration obsolete.  Third,
considering all of Japan’s colonies, we use the presence or absence of a land survey as an instrument
to identify the causal impact of new institutions.  Our estimates show that property-defining institutions
were important for economic development, results that are confirmed when using a similar approach
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1. Introduction 
When and why developed nations became rich are central questions in economics and history.  
The process was undoubtedly complex, involving many factors such as government policies, investments 
in infrastructure, terms of trade, legacies of colonialism, natural resources, climate, and luck.  Differential 
economic progress around the globe over the past half century has stimulated a search for fundamental 
conditions that trigger and sustain the process of development and modernization. 
Many researchers now recognize the importance of institutions that protect property rights for 
economic development (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff 
1997, 2002; Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Nunn 2008). Economic agents are less willing to invest if others can 
seize the returns of their investments (Demsetz 1967, Alchian and Demsetz 1973).  Research on the 
institutional roots of economic development often pays homage to the work of Douglass North and 
collaborators, who were trying to understand the onset and geographic spread of industrialization within 
Europe (North 1990, North and Weingast 1989).  They linked England‘s head start, for example, to the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, which limited the confiscatory power of the Crown and strengthened rights 
in private property.  In their view, the commitment to property rights lowered interest rates on public and 
private investments that became the building blocks of industrialization.  While the pathway is plausible, 
the historical data available to confirm the linkage to British industrialization is modest.   
This paper contributes by clarifying the pathways between property-defining institutions and 
growth, and by incorporating work on a neglected continent, Asia.  We divide property rights into two 
categories: institutions that ‗define‘ property rights such as a land survey system and a land registration 
system and those that ‗protect‘ property rights such as land expropriation laws or constitutional 
safeguards against property takings.  We assess the economic legacy of institutional change imposed by 
Japan on its Asian colonies which were acquired through an opportunistic process of territorial expansion.  
We argue that decisions to colonize were exogenous to late twentieth century growth, a point 
substantiated by results from the quasi experiment in Micronesia.  We return to the issue of exogeneity 
later in the paper.  Prior to colonization these countries had complex systems of land tenure that impeded 
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transactions, including multiple ownership, clan or lineage ownership, poorly defined boundaries, and 
lack of official titles.  In an effort to generate tax revenue, Japanese colonial administrators abolished 
these complex systems in favor of single ownership, official titles, updated land registers and boundaries 
established by clear survey maps.  A new system made plain who was responsible to pay taxes. 
Our inquiry is inspired by rates of economic growth that were vastly different across Asia, where 
Japan was the only Asian country to successfully begin industrialization in the late nineteenth century.  
Asian tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) successfully industrialized in the second 
half of twentieth century while other countries in the region are currently underway or have yet to begin. 
The ratio of per capita GDP between the most developed country and the least developed country in Asia 
is over 25:1.  We ask to what extent might contrasting systems of property rights account for differential 
growth? 
The case of Palau – an island country in Micronesia – provides a quasi-experimental setting, 
which shows that secure private property defining institutions provided a foundation for economic 
development. Japan controlled Micronesia from 1914 to 1945, and in Palau surveyed and registered 
private ownership from 1939 to 1941, classifying land into four categories:  public, clan, lineage, and 
individual.  In 1941 Japan began to survey other Micronesian countries, but the process was interrupted 
by World War II.  After the war the U.S. controlled Micronesia, and in Palau, American judges upheld 
land titles originating from the Japanese land registers.  The American judges consistently concluded that 
clans or lineages did not have any authority over private land.  In other Micronesian countries, the 
American judges lacked legal proof of private ownership and following the tradition of common law, 
upheld customary ownership rights that allowed a village or clan leaders to confiscate or deny land-use 
rights if a resident neglected customary obligations to the village.  As a result foreigners only invested in 
private lands that were protected in an absolute way, as in Palau.  In 2007, Palau was three times richer 
than other Micronesian countries. 
The Asian experience suggests that the Japanese land survey was initially motivated by public 
finance. Land has two special characteristics which distinguish it from other assets: it is "immovable" and 
3 
 
"everlasting."  Generally it is easier for the government to tax land as opposed to other assets that can be 
readily "hidden."  Effective land taxation, however, requires registers and maps to identify parcels, as 
well as a system linking taxpayers to the registers (Cho 2003).  In many countries, land taxes are evaded 
because the government cannot link registers, maps, and taxpayers. The Japanese land survey and 
registration system secured land taxation and thus promoted public finance.   
The solution of a public finance problem eventually was important for private finance. The 
characteristics of land make it attractive to banks as collateral for loans.  Our analysis shows, however, 
that banks accept land as collateral only if secure title and well-defined boundaries were part of a central 
ownership verification system.  The Japanese land registration system was designed to preempt ownership 
and boundary disputes and was well integrated to the ownership updating system and the citizen identity 
system.1 Thus, it promoted private capital markets.  Because land was the most abundant and important 
asset in these agricultural economies, its collateralization provided a major boost for economic 
development. Especially, when farmers obtained access to credit, they invested in irrigation systems that 
increased agricultural productivity. 
 A review of the history of land reforms shows that establishing a good land tenure system was 
more difficult than one might expect.  First, reforms had to contend with rough boundaries used in the 
past.  Landowners tended to exaggerate the size of their land parcels in private land transactions, thus 
most plots carried a history of boundary disputes.  Second, the core of secure land transactions and 
collateralization is a centralized ownership verification system, which required not only land registration, 
but also a citizen identity system and an ownership updating system.  Most governments, however, did 
not fully understand the importance of these components.  Finally, land reforms usually change the whole 
structure of a society, and thus governments potentially face huge costs from socioeconomic and political 
destabilization.   
                                                            
1 Feder et al. (1986), SMERU Research Team (2002), Do and Iyer (2008) find that land titling has positive impacts 
on credit markets but some studies ignore the importance of secure title and central verification, and reach the 
opposite conclusion, as do Boucher, Barham, and Carter (2002), Field and Torero (2004), and Galiani and 
Schargrodsky (2006). 
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In order to understand the conditions under which governments undertake effective land reforms 
that can promote long-run growth, we construct a simple model.  The analytical model based on the 
stylized facts of land reforms shows that a short-sighted government chooses an interior solution, 
surveying only a portion of land, and does not create a citizen identity system or an ownership updating 
system.  In sharp contrast, a far-sighted government chooses a corner solution having all the major 
components of well-defined property rights.  The model shows that the main difference between the 
short-sighted reform and the far-sighted reform is future tax revenue.  The real tax revenue from the 
interior solution without the updating system decreases over time because state‘s land registers gradually 
become obsolete.  Conversely, the real tax revenue from the corner solution is stable because the updated 
land registers and the citizen identity system maintain current information for tax collection.  The model 
also shows that stable tax revenue enables the government to reduce tax rates, to be less arbitrary, and to 
engage in long-range planning. Moreover, the creation of the updating system and the citizen identity 
system provides the institutional foundation for land collateralization.  
 Finally, the paper estimates the impact of institutions on economic growth by using 2 Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) and an instrumental variable that is directly related to the property defining institutions.  
Japan acquired its colonies though wars from the 1890s to the early 1940s, including Taiwan and South 
Korea.  Japan lost all of these colonies after World War II and its land survey was interrupted in some 
places by the war.  We argue that whether Japan conducted and completed a formal land survey is an 
appropriate instrument for property defining institutions (i. e. land tenure system).  Our estimates show 
that property-defining institutions stimulated financial markets that contributed to economic 
development.2 Our results are confirmed when using a similar approach with British Colonies in Asia. 
2. The Evolution of Property Rights in Japan and its Colonies 
According to Wakita (1991), the Taiko land survey of the late sixteenth century established a 
secure land tenure system in Japan, whose  main purpose  was separation of the warrior and peasant 
classes (Asao 1991). Before unification by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the 1590s, a samurai owned peasants 
                                                            
2 We have research underway on Taiwan and Korea, which substantiates our argument based on micro-level data. 
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in his fief.  Thus, the samurai could turn the peasants into soldiers, which provoked many revolts.  In 
order to prevent the frequent rebellions, Toyotomi Hideyoshi separated the two classes. Because the 
warrior class collected taxes in his fief, the separation required a new tax collection system.  Therefore, 
the Taiko land survey identified the cultivator for every plot, which made clear who was responsible to 
pay the tax.   
About 300 years later Japan further modernized the land tenure system.  New tax laws 
promulgated in 1873 provided a uniform land tax, which was payable in money rather than rice and was 
assessed on the value of land, not the size of the harvest.  Thereafter, peasants not only received title to 
the land, but gained the ability to buy and sell land, grow vegetables or fruit instead of rice as they saw fit, 
and even abandon their land if they wished (Duus 1976).   
 Between 1895 and World War II Japan occupied  dozens of countries or territories in Asia.  The 
map given in figure 1 presents a rough time line of territorial acquisitions3, beginning with Taiwan, 
acquired at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895.  Japan invaded the Liaodong peninsula 
during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, and by terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth retained 
Liaodong peninsula and the southern portion of Sakhalin Island.  In 1905 Japan declared Korea as a 
protectorate, and completed the process of colonization by annexation in 1910.  Japan supported the 
Allies in World War I and was later rewarded with Germany‘s colonies in the Pacific (Palau, the Northern 
Mariana Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Federal States of Micronesia).  Japan became increasingly 
militaristic in the 1930s and 1940s, invading Manchuria in 1931 and occupying the remaining territories 
in the south, from the Philippines to Indonesia and Indochina, during World War II. 
 Table 1 summarizes important aspects of pre-colonial land rights in Taiwan and Korea.  The first 
column repeats the salient features of the modern Japanese system: single owner; universal land 
registration that is updated as transactions occur; titles linked to a central registration system; and 
cadastral surveys (i. e. official boundary surveys).  Other areas that became Japanese colonies might have 
had single owners (Korea) but much of the land was either unregistered or the registers were outdated, 
                                                            
3 Japan acquired Okinawa, the Kuril and other islands from 1886 - 1895.   
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titles were not linked to a central system and surveys were based on landmarks.  The systems in Taiwan 
had similar problems and were even more complex than found in Korea with separate top-soil and sub-
soil owners.  
Japanese colonial governments completed land surveys in Taiwan (1898 - 1905) and Korea (1911 
-1918) by which land ownership was identified and registered.  After the survey, registered land increased 
by 215% in Taiwan (Ka 1995) and by 80% in Korea (Kwon 1989).  The main purpose of these land 
surveys was to facilitate tax collection, which was needed to offset costs of colonial administration. Two 
years after the completion of the land survey, tax revenue increased more than three fold in Taiwan (Ka 
1995) and two fold in Korea (Kwon 1989). 
3. A Natural Experiment in Micronesia 
One might suspect that we emphasize the completion of a land survey in Taiwan and South Korea 
because these countries later became rich.  In identifying the long-run economic effects of property rights, 
one must consider the problem of reverse causality, i. e. secure property rights can be a result of economic 
development.   
Reverse causality is not an issue in the case of Palau, a Pacific island that enjoys three times the 
GDP per capita ($7,600 in 2007) compared to other countries in Micronesia (the Marshall Islands, $2,900 
and the Federated States of Micronesia, $2,300 in 2007).  The case of Palau is illustrative because the 
Pacific islands have quite similar initial economic conditions (isolated geographic location and extremely 
limited land area) and a tradition of clan ownership.   
Arguably Palau can be interpreted as an outcome of a natural experiment.  Because of its 
favorable geographic location – for observing British activities in New Guinea as well as American 
activities in Guam and the Philippines – relative to other Japanese interests in the region, Palau became 
the civil headquarters of Micronesia in 1922 (Mangefel and Caldwell 2005, 41).  One might suspect that 
Palau was chosen for its economic potential.  This was not the case.  Japanese evaluation of Micronesia in 
1916 failed to mention economic potential (Purcell 1967, 153).  As a matter of fact, during the German 
era (1899 – 1914) the Marshall islands, which had abundant coconuts, was the economic center of 
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Micronesia, and Truk (a state of the Federated States of Micronesia) had a large population based on 
favorable fishing conditions.  Moreover, the Germans dug a canal and installed an undersea cable station 
in Yap (a state of the Federated States of Micronesia next to Palau), but neglected development in Palau 
(Etpison 2004). 
In Micronesia, the Japanese colonial government first identified the boundaries between public 
lands and private lands from 1923 to 1937.  Then, Japan identified owners and boundaries of private lands 
and made land registers in the Northern Mariana Islands from 1937 to 1939 and in Palau from 1939 to 
1941 (Purcell 1967).  However, in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall islands, the 
Japanese land survey, begun in 1941, was curtailed and eventually stopped by the onset of World War II 
(Damas 1994, McGrath and Wilson 1971).  Consequently, the Federated States of Micronesia and the 
Marshall islands still operate under the clan ownership system. 
Legal cases in Micronesia clearly show the legacy of the Japanese land registration system.  From 
1945-1981 Micronesian countries became the Trust Territory of the United States and during this era 
courts consistently upheld land rights defined by the Japanese land survey in Palau.  The American judges 
consistently concluded that clans or lineages did not have any authority over private land. (Orrukem v. 
Kikuch, Trust Territory Reports (T.T.R.) vol. 2, 533).4   
In sharp contrast, in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, American 
judges were unable to find any basis or evidence of private land ownership and therefore customary land 
law applied. In Micronesia land tenure was based on clan, lineage or group ownership and most 
customary law allowed the chief to confiscate (customarily assigned) land if an individual violated village 
traditions.  Consequently, the courts allowed (or sometimes enforced) the confiscation of land if a 
plaintiff provided clear evidence of violation of the customs by, for example, failing to attend important 
village activities (for example, Amon v. Tobeke T.T.R. vol. 6, 36; Tamaggimed v. Bathin, T.T.R. vol. 2, 
499; Phillip v. Carl, T.T.R. vol. 3, 330; Mita v. Piriska, T.T.R. vol. 3, 168).  With the exception of Palau, 
                                                            
4 See also Ngiruhelbad v. Merii, Imesei, and Tarkong, T.T.R. vol. 1, 367; the opinion of the Appellate Division in 
that action affirming the decision of the Trial Division, T.T.R. vol. 2, 631; the opinion in the case of Lusii Orrukem 
v. Kikuch and Issak; Palau District Civil Action No. 194. 
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this kind of legal tradition remains in Micronesia. In Yap, Civil Action No. 2008-043 states that 
―Generally, land titles in Yap … do not have the same meanings as land titles held elsewhere. … the titles 
are generally subject to various conditions or interests whether or not the conditions or interests are 
mentioned in the certificates of title‖ and the municipal judges can nullify land titles if the land owner 
violates the traditional customs (Yap state government, Section 7 of Yap State Law 2-38). 
One might suspect that other factors such as education, health or infrastructure investments that 
were either unique or relatively more important to Palau led its economic growth.  However, from 1945 to 
1981, U. S. policy treated  these countries as one political entity, the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands.5  In fact, Japan and the United States built and repaired roads, harbors, and airfields not only in 
Palau but also in the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (Close up Foundation 2000, 
Boecker 1993).  Moreover, there was a large expansion of American-style education6 and significant 
sanitation improvements in Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia after 
1945. Economic growth, however, was robust only in Palau where Japan transferred its land tenure 
system completely.   
 One can also study the relationship between secure land tenure and development within Palau.  
Three of the 16 states in Palau – Aimeliik, Airai, and Ngardmau – lack the Japanese land registers 
because they were apparently misplaced in storage or lost in transit to Guam (Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands Office of Land Management, Note on Duplication 1967).  Court records from 2000 to 
2010 show that in Babledaob Island, where ten out of sixteen states are located, the three states lacking 
the Japanese land registers have more disputes (58.9%) in issuing land certificates than other states 
(27.2%) (table 2).   
 The relationship between the lack of a land register and low development is most clearly 
observed in the state of Ngardmau, which sank from one of the most to the least developed states in Palau 
after the land registers were lost. During the colonial era the state became relatively prosperous after the 
                                                            
5 Palau and the Marshall Islands voted for independence, declining to join the Federated States of Micronesia.   
6 The U. S. navy estimated that about 90% of primary school age children were enrolled in schools and 95% of them 
were attending in 1950s (Mangefel and Caldwell 2005). 
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Japanese opened bauxite mines.  In the 1960s, many Japanese companies wanted to reopen the mines, but 
the unclear boundary between public and private lands discouraged this (Petrosian-Husa, Miko, Smaserui 
2002).  Vague boundary and the slow process of land titling were the main obstacles to reopening the 
mines and invigorating economic development.7 
4. Comparison of Land Reforms 
Comparing the traditional land tenure system of Taiwan during the Qing period and colonial land 
tenure system of Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period helps to identify the relationship between 
secure land tenure and economic development.  According to Lin (2008), although the Qing government 
supported economic development, its system had little success in attracting outside capital and modern 
technology due to insecure and complex property rights.  In southern China and Taiwan, custom 
recognized top-soil and sub-soil rights.  The former were permanent tenancy contracts that the community 
recognized as a kind of property (the tenant leased the land for three or four generations). Both top-soil 
and sub-soil rights could be leased. The dual owner system provided security for tenants, but made land 
transactions and tax collection very difficult (Macauley 2009).  Only the native Taiwanese could control 
every aspect of complex property rights: multiple owners and potentially numerous rental contracts (Ka 
1995).  
From June of 1886 to December of 1889 (10 years before the Japanese occupation), a Chinese 
general Liu Ming-chuang reformed the land tenure system of Taiwan, an effort that cost 426,635 ounces 
of silver. Notably the general did not create an updating system to register land sales, new land 
reclamation or other changes from that point onward.  Consequently, this new system gradually lost its 
effectiveness, as had happened with earlier reforms. Their priority was to determine which landowner 
should be taxed under the new system (Lin 2008).  
                                                            
7 One may suspect that  destruction during World War II might be the cause of slow development in Ngardmau, 
which is one of the states on Babeldaob island.  In 1947, the U. S. Geological survey evaluated Ngardmau‘s 
potential for bauxite mining (Petrosian-Husa, Miko, and Smaserui 2002).  They concluded that the principle asset 
remaining were the roads and railway grades, which could be restored and used to good advantage.  The water 
mains, reservoirs, causeway, pier and also possibly the aerial tramway could be rehabilitated at moderate expense. In 
Palau, war destruction was heaviest in the adjacent islands of Peleliu and Angaur, which were the only areas of 
Palau the United States invaded.  
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In contrast, the Japanese colonial government introduced the modern, single owner, land tenure 
system based on accurate cadastral surveys.  Its total expenditures in surveying land and making registers 
were about 4,230,905 ounces of silver (ten times of the expenses of Liu‘s reform; the original expenditure 
was 5,357,188 yen; the annual budget of the traditional Taiwanese government was about 1 million yen). 
More importantly, coupled with a series of land registry regulations, household registry rules, and other 
administrative measures, the government could now record all changes in land distribution and household 
composition (Lin 2008). In order to introduce a single ownership system, the Japanese colonial 
government bought all sub-soil rights and gave legal title to top-soil owners, at a of about 2 million yen 
(Ka 1995).   
After the land reform, land yields and agricultural productivity increased by 81% from 1901 
through 1938 (Lin 2008) and Taiwanese landlords who benefited from the land-tax reform continued to 
save and to invest in commercial enterprises such as sugar and rice processing (Ka 1995).  Moreover, a 
large amount of Japanese capital flowed to Taiwan (Myers and Peattie 1984).   
 The comparison of Japanese and American land reforms in Micronesia also helps to indentify the 
conditions crucial to success. Japan occupied Micronesia from 1919 to 1945 and the U. S. succeeded from 
1945 to 1981.  After occupation, Japan implemented a citizen identity system that included finger prints, a 
land reform, and a tax reform, as they had done earlier in Taiwan and Korea. When Japan officially 
occupied Micronesia in 1919, they conducted a complete census on October 1, 1920.  In fact, Japan was 
so adamant about accuracy, it was made a general rule to carry out the census twice and double-check the 
results.  Japan also introduced a system to register titles and update the register following transactions.  
When the Japanese colonial government introduced land registration in Micronesia, they compensated or 
planned to compensate chiefs.  Consequently, Japan‘s land reform in Micronesia was more successful 
than the one undertaken by Germany (occupied 1899 – 1914), which surveyed only prosperous areas such 
as coconut and pineapple plantations, and prohibited land transactions.   
 In contrast, after occupying Micronesia, the U. S. faced difficulties in implementing an effective 
citizen identity system and a land tenure system. The Trust Territory government clearly acknowledged 
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the critical roles of ‗land surveying‘ and ‗registration and updating‘ for secure land tenure.  For example, 
Trust Territory Policy Letter, P-1, clearly states ―the long range plan includes cadastral survey of all land, 
registration of titles, and recording of all land transfers‖ (Wright 1947, 55).  At the planning stage, 
however, the government did not recognize the importance of citizen identity system.  After the initiation 
of land registration, the American promoters realized that ―Micronesians as a whole do not appreciate the 
need for signatures and correct spelling of names‖ (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 1971, 23).  The 
first land registration project in Micronesia was abandoned by 1951 (McGrath 1971).  In the 1970s, the 
Trust Territory government reinstated a land reform, but its speed was painfully slow (McCutcheon 
1981). 
5. Land Surveys Contribute to Public and Private Finance 
Generally it is easier for the government to tax land because it cannot be readily "hidden" as other 
assets could be. However, effective land taxation requires registers and maps to identify parcels, as well 
as a system linking taxpayers to the registers (Cho 2003).  In many countries, land taxes are evaded 
because the government cannot link the three together. Governments appoint local authorities to make the 
links based on local information, giving them a percentage of the tax receipts as payment.  This remedy is 
imperfect, however, because principal-agent problems often lead to corruption. 
Traditionally Asian countries had land registers, but given the lack of surveys and ownership 
updates, the land registers were not very useful in collecting land taxes directly from the taxpayers. Sng 
(2009) argues that it was difficult for the central government to increase tax revenues assigned to local 
authorities because the poor usually shouldered a heavy tax burden.  The Japanese land survey linked the 
registers, maps, and taxpayers.  Moreover, the Japanese colonial government also introduced a citizen 
identity system in Korea and Taiwan as a way to control the population, but this facilitated tax collection 
by identifying particular individuals as taxpayers. The Japanese colonial governments faced large budget 
deficits during the land reform, but the new land tax system was cost effective and much more successful 
than expected.  The total cost of land reform in Taiwan was 5.3 million yen, but the annual land tax 
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revenue increased by 2 million yen.8 In Korea, the Japanese colonial government was able to decrease the 
land tax rate from 3% (planned) to 1.5% as a result of higher-than-expected revenues.  Finally, it should 
be noted that stable tax revenue expands the state‘s ability to undertake public projects by selling bonds 
(Furguson 2001).  Government can issue bonds only if they have predictable tax revenue.   
Interestingly, the solution of a public finance problem eventually was important for private 
finance.  Because land is immovable and everlasting, banks are more willing to accept it as collateral 
relative to other assets that can be stolen, hidden, or readily destroyed. Tapping land as collateral, 
however, is more difficult than one might expect. Legally, land ownership is an abstract concept and what 
the seller of land owns and offers is ―the right to sell‖ (tenants and squatters have the right to use but lack 
the right to sell). However, ―the right to sell‖ is justified only by the law (Simpson 1976).  In most 
cultures, traditionally land was considered to be held either directly or indirectly from the King.  
Therefore to prove ownership the title had to be traced back to the original Crown grant (or state grant).  
For example, in the U. S., title insurance links the deed through an unbroken chain to the original state 
grant.  Therefore, a centralized information exchange system such as a record of deeds or registration of 
title is a very efficient way of proving ownership.  Moreover, land ownership has a very special problem, 
i. e. boundary disputes.  Therefore, banks are more willing to accept land as collateral if secure title and 
well-defined boundaries are part of a central ownership verification system.  A land survey clarifies the 
boundary and makes abstract land ownership more concrete and secure by reducing boundary disputes.   
Experiences in Asia suggest that the following are effective links of a chain:  land surveys, a 
citizen identity system, land titles, recording of deeds or registration of titles, and acceptable collateral. 
First, banks are reluctant to accept land titles as collateral if the document does not clearly specify the 
boundaries. In developing countries, many land titles vaguely describe the boundaries, often based on 
landmarks, not a cadastral survey.  Thus, if the landmark is destroyed or moved, boundary disputes 
follow.  Without clear boundaries, the size and value of land is vague and consequently using land as 
collateral becomes risky.  For example, in Thailand 55 percent of land is held under a certificate of 
                                                            
8 The land tax revenue increased from 0.92 million yen in 1903 to 2.98 million yen in 1905. 
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utilization, which is a quasi-formal land title having rough boundaries, but banks do not accept this as 
collateral. In Thailand, only 15 percent of land has a legal title based on a cadastral survey acceptable to 
banks (Angus-Leppan and Williamson 1985).      
Second, governments must provide a centralized ownership verification system.  Korea‘s legal 
history provides a good example.  Prior to 1918 there was no official registration system and Koreans 
could not register titles in land transactions. Before this step, the Japanese colonial government issued a 
verification letter for land transactions. The law, however, implicitly stated that the letter did not 
guarantee ownership to a third person (Cho 2003). Foreigners could buy land in Korea after 19059 and the 
colonial government tried to promote land transactions by verification letters, but ownership was not fully 
guaranteed. After the land survey, the registration-of-title system started and the law explicitly indicated 
that the government guaranteed ownership of such land. Consequently, banks began to accept land titles 
as collateral with more confidence.  
Finally, it should be noted that a well established citizen identity system should be combined with 
a centralized ownership verification system.  In many cultures, people have multiple names for different 
purposes.  For example, in traditional Korea a man was given names at birth, as an adult, an official name 
for governments, a name for the family history, and a nickname.  Thus, the Korean government had 
difficulty in identifying the owner of land from the name used on the traditional land register.  Without a 
system that identifies a person with a single name, land cannot be used as secure collateral. 
At the time of Japanese conquest, Korea and Taiwan were heavily agricultural and land was the 
most abundant asset. By accepting land as collateral, banks solved a problem of private finance.  In 
Korea, for example, Chosun bank – which played a major role in the 1910s – depended mainly on credit 
collateral and faced many loan default problems in the 1920s, and thereafter decreased its credit loans. In 
contrast, Siksan bank – which played a major role in the 1920s – required land as collateral and did not 
face such problems (figure 2) (Oh 1996). After the official land registration system was operational, 
access to credit became easier and interest rates declined.  The total amount of collateralized loans from 
                                                            
9 The Japanese colonial government also introduced laws for house and land collateral in 1905. 
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banks increased in Korea (table 3) after 1918 and the total number of collateralized parcels of land 
increased in Taiwan after 1905 (table 4) because land titles became reliable.  After the Japanese land 
survey and registration in Korea, the private interest rate decreased to 30% and kept falling over the next 
20 years (figure 3a).10 A similar pattern is observed in Taiwan (figure 3b). Figure 2 shows that the total 
amount of bank loans increased in Korea and figure 4 shows that value added in the financial sector 
increased dramatically after the land survey was completed. 
Various features of land tenure explain why land titling might have little impact on credit markets 
in some cases.  Many African countries do not require a clear boundary map in land titling (Dale 1976) 
and fail to provide a centralized ownership verification system.  It is worth noting that limited impacts on 
credit markets are reported in land titling for squatters in urban areas (Field and Torero 2004, Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2006).  Land titles issued to squatters are intrinsically less secure because ownership 
disputes can occur between the original legal owners and squatters who obtained land titles (or ownership 
can be restored to the original legal owners by political changes).  In fact, Galiani and Schargrodsky 
(2006) report disputes between the original legal owners and the government in the processes of land 
titling and land expropriation from original legal owners.  Thus, it is plausible that banks are less willing 
to accept recently issued land titles to the squatters in the short run.  Additional barriers to credit markets 
originate from a poor citizen identity system, and lack of an updating system and a reliable centralized 
ownership verification system.  
6. Pathways between Property Rights and Economic Growth  
Historical evidence suggests that good property defining institutions stimulate land transactions; 
capital investment; lower interest rates through the development of financial markets; improve the inflow 
of outside capital; and facilitate the transfer of technology. 
On the first point, good property defining institutions facilitate land transactions and mortgaging.  
A well established land registration system allows sub-division of land, which helps to match parcel size 
with collateral needs.  This might seem unimportant, except under many customs and laws, all of the 
                                                            
10 Traditionally, the private interest rate was about 50% in Korea. 
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collateralized property can be forfeited to the creditor, regardless of the difference between the value of 
the property and the amount of the debt (Kim 2008).  In addition, with effective land transactions, land 
values tend to rise because the size of the market increases and resources are more likely to flow into their 
highest valued use (Alston, Libecap and Mueller 1999). 
Second, the inflow of outside capital is very sensitive to property defining institutions as 
illustrated by the case of Hawaii.  In Hawaii most land was owned by the government or a small number 
of landlords.  Before 1967, most people leased property for 55 years rather than buying the land and 
houses (La Croix 1995).  Consequently, mainland Americans were reluctant to invest in Hawaii because 
the land tenure system was unfamiliar and perhaps subject to arbitrary change.  Similarly, Etpison (2004) 
explicitly describes that ―land title disputes scared off legitimate investors, and make high-end hotel 
development a real challenge [in Micronesia].‖  
Finally, transfer of technology is also sensitive to property defining institutions.  Observers have 
suggested, for example, that the collective land tenure system in Africa is an obstacle to adapting Western 
irrigation technology, which operates most efficiently on a large scale.  Collective ownership of land 
complicates decision making by creating hold outs and assorted groups with diverse if not adversarial 
interests.  Customary (tribal) law, therefore, impedes the adoption of this complex and expensive 
technology (Slabbers 1990). 
 The process of irrigation investment in Korea illustrates a clear pathway from a secure land 
tenure system to economic development.  According to Rhee et al. (1992) irrigation investment was 
possible because the land survey clearly identified the boundaries and owner of the land.  After the land 
survey, the board for the new irrigation system could use the land register to identify and gain permission 
from the relevant land owners.11  Moreover, the board could identify the land owners who needed 
compensation resulting from making new reservoirs and water distribution ditches. When the permission 
and compensation processes were finished, the relevant farmers could finance the cost for the new 
                                                            
11 In order to create a cooperative, the board was required to obtain permissions from a majority of land owners who 
owned at least two-thirds of the land area. Free riding was not a problem in setting up the cooperative because large 
landlords received the greatest benefit.  
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irrigation system by getting loans from banks. Banks founded by Japanese capital accepted land titles as 
collateral and the farmers received a low interest rate (However, the irrigation investments were such big 
projects that farmers often paid back their loans over twenty to thirty years).    
 After the completion of irrigation projects and subsequent adjustments12, agricultural productivity 
in paddy land increased by 67 to 200 percent in Korea (Rhee et al. 1992).13 On average, there was a 
drought every eight years (figure 5) and extremely severe drought every twenty five years in Korea (Rhee 
and Cho 2005, Rhee 2009).  Thus, it is clear why the farmers invested in the irrigation system when they 
first obtained access to credit.  After 1918 one can observe that agricultural loans increased (figure 6) and 
the portion of land as collateral also grew (figure 7).  The irrigation investments in Taiwan doubled the 
quantity of arable land from 1898to 1940 (Ka 1995).   
The case of Korea shows why the transfer of a western irrigation system is very difficult under 
conditions faced in many African countries.  Even though an irrigation project may be financed by 
international organizations, the permission and compensation processes are stymied by the clan 
ownership system.   
7. Stylized Facts of Land Reforms 
 Why do many developing countries fail to implement a secure land tenure system that solves 
public and private finance problems and leads to economic development?  According to Simpson (1976)  
―[Land registration] is a device which may [be] essential to sound land administration but 
it is merely part of the machinery of government.  It is not some sort of magical [device] 
which will automatically produce good land use and development; nor is it a system of 
land holding; it is not even a kind of land reform, though it may be a valuable 
administrative aid to land reform.  In short, land registration is only a means to an end.  It 
is not an end itself.  Much time, money, and effort can be wasted if that elementary truth 
be forgotten (Simpson 1976, 3).‖ 
 
Unfortunately, a review of the history of land reforms suggests that many governments either did not 
learn or forgot this elementary truth, and thus waste much time, money, and effort.   
                                                            
12 Agricultural productivity does not increase immediately partly because micro-organisms in the soil must adjust to 
more water.  
13  Land reforms that led to irrigation investments and rising agricultural productivity are also reported in Botswana 
(Machacha 1986) and Kyrgyzstan (Akramov and Omuraliev 2009). 
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 The review identifies some stylized facts that underlie land reforms.  First, the variable cost 
function is convex, but most promoters of reform do not recognize this structure at the outset.  Instead 
they may anticipate a concave function because the administrative effort of registering a parcel of land 
decreases with volume.  The realized function, however, is convex because the most costly aspect is 
surveying the boundaries, which increases convexly.  In the example of figure 8, one can observe that the 
number of boundaries to be identified increases by n2-2n where n is the total number of parcels.  For 
example, if there are 4 parcels of land, then the surveyor needs to identify 4 boundaries between 4 parcels.  
However, for 9 parcels it is 12 boundaries and for 16 parcels it is 24 boundaries.  In short, if the number 
of parcels increases by one, then the number of boundaries to be identified increases by one or more.   
 Second, creating and implementing an updating system and a citizen identity system are very 
difficult and costly.  Governments understand the importance of an ownership updating system but 
typically underestimate or do not want to bear the cost.  The simplest (and cheapest) system periodically 
resurveyed ownership by visiting the plot, as was done in China and Korea every five years.  However, 
the resurveyed register gradually lost its information value as transactions made it obsolete. Moreover, 
given a principle-agent problem, government officials frequently copied and resubmitted the old land 
registers rather than expending effort to resurvey ownership.   
A record of deeds—sometimes called an abstract of title that shows the history of transactions-- is 
a better system but also has limitations.   Over time it may become obsolete unless ownership is 
systematically verified after transactions occur.14  A central registration of titles is the most effective 
system, but it was not implemented until the mid nineteenth century.15  A record of deeds and registration 
of title require centralized recording, a systematic coordination system, and legal regulations that update 
the validity of ownership.  Moreover, transferring old records to a new system was not a simple task.  In 
                                                            
14 A deed does not in itself prove title; it is merely a record of an isolated transaction. A deed does not confirm that 
the parties were legally entitled to carry out the transaction and by itself does not prove the transaction valid. It 
follows therefore that investigation of its validity and legal effect will still be necessary before any further 
transactions can be safely conducted on the strength of it (Simpson 1976, 15). 
15 A register of title is an authoritative record kept in a public office.  The register is at all times the final authority 
and the State accepts responsibility for the validity of transactions, which are affected by making an entry in the 
register and only by this means (Simpson 1976, 15-16). 
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many cases the importance of a citizen identity system was not recognized until land reform was well 
underway.  Consequently, the unexpected high costs discouraged complete implementation of systems 
that were critical for centralized ownership verification.   
 Third, the land reform usually changed the whole structure of a society, imposing political costs.  
Most land reforms in developing countries created individual ownership from communally owned land, 
which heavily affected not only current but future economic activities.  This confronted traditions of 
multiple or clan ownership.16  With the exception of the new registered owners, other traditional owners 
of land lost use rights forever.  Eliminating clan ownership meant that the chief – the political leader – 
would lose his control in managing the clan‘s land.  The experience in Yap in 1970s shows how the 
political leaders fought the change and nullified the effect of land reform (Marksbury 1979). In addition, 
landowners who were unsatisfied with the boundaries were against the land reform.  The review suggests 
that these political costs existed for colonizers but were much higher or difficult to overcome if 
undertaken by traditional governments.17  Colonizers that succeeded in imposing land reform, such as 
Japan, compensated the chiefs and other traditional land owners who lost land-use rights. 18    
Finally, the review shows that whether a government is short-sighted or far-sighted is critical for 
the success of a land reform.  A short-sighted government can be defined as one that is interested in short-
term tax revenue.  In contrast, a far-sighted government promotes long-run economic growth.  For 
example, the conflict between Pierre Poivre and the French mercantilists shows the different viewpoints 
between the short-sighted and far-sighted government.  From 1767 to 1772, Pierre Poivre served as 
governor in Mauritius.  He accurately estimated population and the island‘s natural resources and 
instituted a land tribunal to survey and adjudicate concessions (Vaughan 2005, 69).  ―Poivre brought the 
island to self-sufficiency, in opposition to the prevailing mercantilist doctrine that colonies should be 
exploited for the benefit of the mother country. By the time he left Mauritius in 1772, Poivre and his 
                                                            
16 In fact, the duality of ownership in land even existed in the sixteenth century England, as a way to avoid feudal 
dues. 
17 Many colonizers tried to implement land registration systems.  For example, the first land register of England – 
the Doomsday Book – was made by the William who conquered England in 1066. 
18 Similarly, when the Hawaiian government introduced the land registration, the government compensated chiefs.   
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supporters were finding themselves outmaneuvered by mercantilist governors and ministers who were 
more interested in short-term profits than long-term prosperity‖ (Maverick 1941).  
 When short-sighted governments realized it was very costly in the near term to survey, register 
and update all land ownership, they restricted the process to prosperous areas.  For example, the Germans 
surveyed and registered only coconut and pineapple plantations in Micronesia and the British did the 
same only for white settler‘s farm land in sub-Saharan Africa.  Limited and isolated surveys required less 
investment in boundary identification.  Moreover, these limited surveys usually did not heavily depended 
on creating an updating system, because transactions occurred infrequently or were prohibited by the 
colonizers.   
8. A Model of Land Reform 
 We construct a simple model based on the stylized facts.  The goal is to understand the conditions 
under which governments undertake effective land reforms that can promote long-run growth. 
8.1. Cost and Revenue Functions of Land Reform 
 The cost function of a land reform is defined as follows: 
Cost =                      
where   denotes a fixed cost of implementing land reform (   > 0),   denotes total amount of registered 
land by the land reform (   > 0),    denotes the cost of creating an updating system (    ),    
denotes the cost of creating a citizen identity system (    ),    denotes a political cost, and    
denotes the degree of political dominance (             .   
 For simplicity, we assume a linear tax revenue function (the analysis is consistent with a concave 
revenue function).  The revenue function of the land reform is defined as follows: 
Revenue =     
where   denotes tax rate (   ),   denotes the average price of registered land, which is normalized 
   .   
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     denotes tax revenue under the current taxation system, and       denotes minimum tax 
revenue that the government desires to collect.    denotes the portion of valid information of the land 
register in the following year. With the updating and identity systems     (all information in the land 
register is valid and is linked to the taxpayers).  Without two systems,     (the land register becomes 
obsolete over time).    is the discount factor of the short-sighted government,   is the discount factor of 
the far-sighted government, and   is one plus the rate of inflation. We assume that the average price of 
registered land increases by the rate of inflation.  For a simple calculation, we assume that the discount 
factor of the far-sighted government is   
 
 
 for both of the tax revenue and the deficit.  Moreover, we 
assume that      for the deficit, but       for the tax revenue where    .       denotes the total 
area of land in the country,    denotes the optimal level of land registration, and       denotes the 
number of years required to complete the land reform, which is an increasing function of   .  We assume 
that the government collects      before the completion of the land reform and collects   
 after the 
completion of the land reform. 
8.2. Interior Solution of Short-sighted Government 
 Historically, land was the main source of wealth, thus the main source of revenue. When the tax 
revenue under the current taxation system (    ) becomes smaller than the minimum tax revenue that 
government desires to collect (    ), a government considers a land reform to increase its income.   
 The marginal revenue of land reform is   and the marginal cost of land reform is    .  Assuming 
the existence of an interior solution, the short-sighted government chooses    
 
  
 (figure 9).  
After determining the optimal level of land registration, the government considers three factors: 
the cost, the budget deficit during the reform, and the increased revenue after completion.  First, the cost 
of land reform for the short-sighted government – only interested in a short term profit – is  
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because it is unwilling to spend much money for creating the updating system and the citizen identity 
system and the discount factor of the deficit (  ) is   
 
 
.  Second, the deficit of the short-sighted 
government during       years of land reform is 
              
      
  
   
 
                                  
           
               
         
Finally, the present value of increased tax revenue after the completion of land reform is, 
  
       
       
         
  
    
 
   
               
         
      
                   
           
        
because the discount factor of tax revenue (  ) is   . 
 The short-sighted government completes the land reform if 
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In other words, the expected profit of the land reform should be positive and the annual deficit of the 
government during the land reform should be lower than the deficit tolerance level of the government.  
Otherwise, the government stops the land reform. 
The first condition explains why the colonial governments or conquerors are more likely to 
implement land reforms than traditional governments. The degree of political dominance (  ) of 
colonizers is more likely to be larger than that of traditional governments because military power 
accompanied colonization.  Moreover, the tax revenue from the old system (    ) for a colonizer can be, 
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in effect, zero. Thus, the first condition is more likely to be satisfied.  In addition, the colonial government 
cannot but endure the deficit after the colonization.  
Two conditions of the land reform also explain why the short-sighted government is less likely to 
create the updating and identity systems.  Creating two systems increases the costs of land reform 
significantly, increasing the annual deficit.  Moreover, the government is very likely to face higher 
political costs due to the loss of political support after the initiation of the land reform. Thus, even if the 
government realized the importance of those two systems after the initiation of the land reform, it is 
unable to impose those two systems.   
8.3. The Corner Solution of the Far-sighted Government 
 A far-sighted government is interested in long-term growth, and thus creates both the updating 
system and the citizen identity system, if it realizes the importance of those systems.   
 The cost of land reform of the far-sighted government is 
                     
However, the revenue structure from the land reform depends upon the package adopted.  The updating 
and identity systems continuously validates the land register and taxpayers (  =1). Sng (2009) argues that 
increasing tax revenue for traditional governments is very difficult due to a principle-agent problem. 
Under a corrupt tax collection system operated by local authorities, the poor shouldered heavy burdens 
and a riot could ensue if the government imposed higher tax rates.  With the updating and identity 
systems, the government can collect revenue directly from taxpayers.  Therefore, the tax system becomes 
relatively fairer and the government is effectively able to grow tax revenue by the rate of inflation. 
The present value of revenue of the land reform is 
                             
 
 
      
In other words, after the completion of the land reform, the government‘s real tax revenue does not 
decrease over time.  In this case, the conditions of performing the land reform are 
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The first condition is always satisfied even though           is very large.  Thus, the 
government registers all land (      ) to maximize the real tax revenue (figure 9). In addition, the 
review of land reforms indicates that the updating system works more efficiently when all land is 
registered. The government, however, endures a larger deficit for a longer period of time in the interim.   
8.4. Tax Rate and Discount Factor 
 In the previous section, the tax rate is assumed to be exogenous.  Experience in Asia, however, 
suggests that after the completion of the land reform, the far-sighted government is able to lower its tax 
rates because the registered land in the corner solution is larger than that of the interior solution (     
   ).  In this section, we assume that the probability of a riot is an increasing function of the tax rate and 
the discount factor of the government is a function of the probability of a riot.  In other words, a high tax 
rate decreases the discount factor of the government.  For example, we may suppose that  
            
 
                      
 
where          denotes the tax rate that government will not face any riot.  For the far-sighted 
government, if               , then, the discount factor of the far-sighted government becomes   
 
 
.  
In contrast, the tax revenue of the short-sighted government keeps decreasing over time as the land 
register becomes obsolete.  When the tax revenue becomes less than its minimum spending level (    ), 
the short-sighted government needs to increase its tax rate, suggesting that the government faces a higher 
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probability of potential resistance and becomes more short-sighted over time (or the government becomes 
more arbitrary in taxation to increase its tax revenue).  
 9. Empirical Estimation: Two State Least Squares 
 In this section, we estimate the long-term effects of good property defining institutions. We 
address reverse causality by using instrumental variables that measure the degree of institutional transfer.  
We argue that whether Japan conducted and completed a formal land survey is a valid instrument because 
the Japanese occupation and the completion of the land surveys were determined opportunistically, and 
Japan abruptly lost all of its colonies after World War II.19  We maintain that the new property defining 
institutions (i.e. Japanese land tenure system) persisted.  In fact, the current land tenure systems of 
Taiwan, South Korean, and Palau are based on Japanese land surveys.  For example, in South Korea the 
original Japanese land registers are still in daily use (Gragert 1994).  Consequently, the completion of a 
Japanese land survey affects current GDP per capita only through institutions of land rights. 
 In Asia, secure land tenure systems are found not only in Taiwan, Korea, and Palau, but also in 
Hong Kong and Singapore. In the latter cases the British colonial government transferred institutions of 
land rights.  These historical facts enable us to extend the scope of institutional analysis and provide a 
consistent explanation for the origins of economic growth in Asia.   
Hong Kong and Singapore began as British colonies, with British legal and administrative 
systems. Both are densely populated cities and land is a scarce resource. However, less well known is the 
fact that the state owns all the land in Hong Kong, and four-fifths of the land in Singapore (Phang 2000). 
                                                            
19 Japan‘s early interest in Taiwan, Korea, and Palau had little to do with industrial potential. Taiwan was acquired 
largely for reasons of honor and prestige from the Sino-Japanese War.  In 1895 Taiwan was viewed ―as unimportant 
to China and as quite abhorrently un-Chinese‖ (Hong and Murray 2005, 61).  In fact, the Chinese general Li 
Hongzhang, who ceded Taiwan to Japan, informed the Emperor that the loss was trivial because it was a land of 
brigands, murderers, and pirates (Hong and Murray 2005).  Korea was acquired largely because Japan felt that 
another power having a military presence on the peninsula would have been detrimental to Japanese national 
security.  At that time Korea was described as "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan."  Also, it is clear that Japan 
was not able to predict the division of Korea in 1945 and the consequent poor economic performance of North 
Korea.  Japan occupied Micronesia including The Northern Mariana Islands and Palau because the British requested 
them to attack the German naval bases in Asia during World War I.  Finally, Japan‘s loss of all colonies after World 
War II makes the end of occupation an exogenous event in the colonies.      
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 In Hong Kong and Singapore, the governments own and lease property.  If the leasing contracts 
provided good property defining institutions for land, then we can apply the analysis of land tenure to 
these places. The following excerpt from Phang (2000) shows that British colonial leases, in fact were 
secure. 
The British government, on taking over Hong Kong Island in 1841, recognized 
immediately the importance of controlling land. In 1843, it proclaimed that all land 
belongs to the Crown and that the government would not allow any private ownership of 
land. Leases were sold at public auctions or granted directly for the payment of an annual 
rent. Enforcement powers for land use decisions are found in the Building Ordinance and 
contractual powers in Crown leases.  
 
In 1826, English statutes in force on November 26, 1826, and the principles of common 
law and equity were received as part of the law in Singapore. This meant that English 
doctrines of tenure and estates operated in Singapore. (Phang 2000) 
 
 In contrast, the British occupied India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka for an extended 
period, but their colonial government failed for some time to transfer the British land tenure system.  A 
history of Sri Lanka's cadastral survey clearly shows that the British failed to transfer its land tenure 
system. 
After the occupation of the country by the British, several attempts had been made for the 
establishment of a cadastre based on cadastral surveys. The proclamation by Governor 
North in the year 1800 for land owners to appear before the 'Land raad' (a judicial 
official) to produce evidence of title and get their lands surveyed was the first attempt. 
This failed. 
 
Systematic cadastral surveys commenced in three sub urban villages within the capital 
Colombo itself based on an Act passed in 1877 for the purpose. However, this activity 
was abandoned in 1891, after three years of operation, mainly due to the high costs 
involved. Subsequent attempts in the form of several studies, recommendations and draft 
acts prepared for the purpose did not borne fruit. 
 
There is at present, what can be described as, a limited cadastre.  About eighty percent of 
the country is covered by village plans prepared by the Surveyor General demarcating 
State (Crown) land. These plans are [...] prepared after 1910. 
Source - Cadastral Template, Country report: Sri Lanka (2003) 
http://www.cadastraltemplate.org 
 
As the above excerpt shows, the British colonial government attempted to implement a modern 
land tenure system in Sri Lanka, but it failed in 1800, and failed again in 1891 due to the high cost. 
Although the British occupied Sri Lanka for 153 years, the British colonial government could not transfer 
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the crucial British institutions (i. e. the land tenure system based on cadastral surveys) for 114 years. Thus 
a huge difference existed between Sri Lanka and the two city-states, Hong Kong and Singapore.  
Considering this difference, we suggest two more instruments. The first is whether a country is a 
city-state (CITY) that has a small land area to survey and register.  The second instrument is the number 
of years of British occupation after the successful introduction of the British land tenure system 
(REVISED LENGTH OF BRITISH OCCUPATION), which is directly related to the transfer of a land 
registration system and operational experience.  For example, if we count the number of years of British 
occupation in Sri Lanka after 1910 (when the village plans enabled a limited cadastre), REVISED 
LENGTH OF BRITISH OCCUPATION for Sri Lanka is 39 years. Since most of the countries clearly 
recorded when the laws for the land tenure system were enacted, REVISED LENGTH OF BRITISH 
OCCUPATION can be calculated with less concern of subjectivity (See appendix 2). 
By using the completion of a Japanese land survey, whether a country is a city-state, or revised 
length of British occupation as instruments, we can estimate the impact of institutions on economic 
growth without concern for reverse causality and measurement errors of institutional quality.  Table 5 
contains the basic information on 30 former Japanese and British colonies in Asia.  Thailand, a Southeast 
Asian country that did not experience any colonial occupation, is also included in the regression.20  Data 
on the log of GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity) are taken from the CIA World Fact Book (2007), 
which covers all of the Pacific Islands.  The World Bank and IMF's GDP per capita (PPP) figures, 
however, are very similar to the CIA World Fact Book estimates. 
We consider various measures of current institutional quality assembled under the auspices of the 
World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007). The World Bank's governance indicators provide 
annual measures of six institutions, which we averaged over the years 1996-2007: 
A. Voice and Accountability; B. Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism; C. Government 
Effectiveness; D. Regulatory Quality; E. Rule of Law; F. Control of Corruption. 
                                                            
20 Since Japan colonized only parts of China and Russia, those countries are excluded (robustness checks are 
discussed later). 
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Measure E, Rule of Law – measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence – is used as the main measure of 
institutions. The other measures are used to check for robustness, which is confirmed. 
In this paper, we replicated the methodology of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) who 
emphasized property protecting institutions, because one of our main purposes is showing that property 
defining institutions are equally important in the long run. However, we use instruments that are directly 
related to the property defining institutions (i. e. LAND SURVEY, CITY, or REVISED LENGTH OF 
BRITISH OCCUPATION) to avoid pitfalls of weak instruments. Mortality rates and population density 
that are relevant to migration and transfer of institutions are not used as instruments because we believe 
land is a more fundamental and concrete determinant than those two variables, given that most migrants 
were farmers.21  For example, Ferguson (2003) clearly describes that ―the lure [of migration] was the 
offer of 160 acres of virgin real estate in Saskatchewan, free of charge.‖ The history of Japanese 
migration also indicates that the land was the most important motivating factor (Purcell 1967).   
The first task is to estimate the relationship between institutions and GDP per capita, for which 
we use the following specification: 
LGDP = a1 + a2 INSTITUTION + a3 PACIFIC ISLAND + e    (1) 
where LGDP is the log GDP per capita (PPP in 2007) of the country, INSTITUTION is the governance 
indicator of the country (E. Rule of Law; high score denotes secure property rights in the standard normal 
distribution setting), and PACIFIC ISLAND equals one if the country is a Pacific island, zero otherwise. 
The specification is motivated by work of Hall and Jones (1999) who maintain that institutions 
are the primary and fundamental determinant of economic growth.  This conviction is based in part on the 
finding that human capital and physical capital explain a modest portion of cross-country differences in 
productivity.  They observe, for example, that of the 35-fold difference in output per worker between the 
                                                            
21 REVISED LENGTH OF JAPANESE OCCUPATION is not used because its correlation with LAND SURVEY is 
0.974 
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United States and Niger, only a factor of 1.5 is explained by physical capital and only a factor of 3.1 is 
explained by human capital. The remaining difference - a factor of 7.7 – is a productivity residual.   
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions are given in table 6. As can be seen, 
INSTITUTION and PACIFIC ISLAND are significant at the 1% level. 
Next, we address the reverse causality and measurement error problems using the completion of a 
Japanese land survey, whether or not the entity is a city-state, and revised length of British occupation as 
instruments for estimating the degree of institutional transfer.  We also use the length of British 
occupation for a comparison.  The equations for the first stage are as follows: 
INSTITUTION = b1 + b2 LAND SURVEY + b3 PACIFIC ISLAND  
            + b4 CITY + u    (2a) 
INSTITUTION = c1 + c2 LAND SURVEY + c3 PACIFIC ISLAND  
            + c4 REVISED LENGTH OF BRITISH OCCUPATION + t    (2b) 
   INSTITUTION = d1 + d2 LAND SURVEY + d3 PACIFIC ISLAND  
             + d4 LENGTH OF BRITISH OCCUPATION + n    (2c) 
 where LAND SURVEY equals one if the Japanese colonial government completed a land survey in the 
country, CITY equals one if a country is a city-state, REVISED LENGTH OF BRITISH OCCUPATION 
is the number of years of British occupation of the country after the successful introduction of the British 
land tenure system, and LENGTH OF BRITISH OCCUPATATION is the number of years of British 
occupation. 
 The first stage regression results are given in table 7.  In order to check the strength of 
instruments, this paper uses four weak instrument tests suggested by recent econometric studies: 1) Shea's 
Partial R-squared (a weak instrument test, low R-squared means weak instruments); 2) Anderson's 
Canonical Correlation LM statistic (an under-identification test, H0: under-identified); 3) Stock-Yogo 
statistics (a weak instrument and size distortion test); and 4) Sargan statistics (an over-identification test, 
H0: instruments are valid). These tests suggest that LAND SURVEY, CITY, and REVISED LENGTH OF 
BRITISH OCCUPATION are valid instruments. 
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As can be seen in table 6, the effect of institutions is greater in the 2SLS regression if LAND 
SURVEY and REVISED LENGTH OF BRITISH OCCUPATION are used as instruments (regression 
results are similar when LAND SURVEY and CITY are used). The coefficient on institutions from the 
OLS estimates is 1.102 (significant at 1% level) and from the IV estimate is 1.421 (significant at 1% 
level). A Hausman test confirms that there is a systematic difference (at 5% level) between OLS and IV 
estimates.22 This empirical result is consistent with the findings of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001) who focus on property protecting institutions and shows that property defining institutions were 
important in Asia.  
Our empirical results also indicate that the methodology suggested by Hall and Jones (1999) and 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) should be adopted with caution.  For example, using LENGTH 
OF BRITISH OCCUPATION, which is possibly related to property rights institutions may lead to a 
different conclusion.  Here, we suggest that focusing on property defining institutions is a better strategy 
in finding reliable instruments. 
10. Concluding Remarks 
 The historical record provides an excellent laboratory for study of institutions and economic 
growth, but existing work tends to exclude Asia and focuses on property protecting institutions.  
 Japan began to establish a secure land tenure system in the late sixteenth century and completed 
the process in 1873.  Its colonial governments transferred the Japanese land tenure system to Taiwan and 
Korea – two growth miracles – and Palau – a leading economy in the Pacific. Abundant and reliable data 
in Asia from the early twentieth century allow us to identify the mechanism linking property defining 
institutions to economic growth.  Instrumental variable estimates suggest that secure property rights 
stimulated economic growth.   
                                                            
22 The regression result is roughly similar when we control for the length of American, French, German, Portuguese, 
Spanish occupation in Asia.  However, those colonizers were not effective in transferring their land tenure systems  
(the coefficients are insignificant and very close to 0 in the first stage), thus we did not control for other colonizes in 
the main regression.  Also, Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) report that a combination of strong and weak 
instruments can be weak.  
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Historical analysis shows that a thorough land tenure system solves a public finance problem by 
linking land registers, maps, and taxpayers.  Moreover, the solution to a public finance problem spills 
over to private finance. A proper land survey defines boundaries and registration of titles enables banks to 
readily verify ownership.  Because land is the most abundant asset in agricultural economies, its 
collateralization can provide a major boost for financial markets that nurture economic development. In 
Asia, a secure land tenure system combined with financial market developments encouraged investment, 
promoted new technology such as irrigation systems, and consequently increased agricultural 
productivity. 
The identified pathways in Asia suggest that property defining institutions were a major stimulus 
to economic development. Although property defining institutions and property protecting institutions are 
closely related, we think the reverse causality problem is less severe in property defining institutions.  The 
motivation of land reform was solving a budget deficit and raising tax revenue.  In order to solve the 
budget problem, the government surveyed available assets such as land and population. The survey and 
updating system made the economy of country more manageable by the government.  Historical and 
political viewpoints on the emergence of modern nation-states also emphasize increasing the taxation 
capacity of governments (Tilly 1990, Furgerson 2001, and Besley and Persson 2009).  
 Our review of the history of land reforms suggests that success requires a clear understanding of 
the importance of clear boundary lines, the citizen identity system, and the ownership updating system.  
The analytical model shows that a far-sighted land reform is more costly than the short-sighted version 
but solves the long-term problem of public finance.  The review suggests that the skills to establish and 
maintain a secure land system are a form of institutional capital.   
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Figure 2. Total amount of loan and the decomposition of loan amount by banks 
 
Source. – Oh (1996) 
 
Figure 3a. Public and Private interest rates (%) in Korea, 1910 – 1944 
 
Source. – Kim and Park (2004) 
Note. – Public interest rate: Chosun, Siksan, Botong; Private interest rate: Daegeum, Youngam(chaip), 
Youngam(1), Youngam(2); Inflation was high in early 1920s due to aftermaths of World War I. 
 
Figure 3b. Public and Private interest rates in Taiwan, 1903 – 1945 
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Source. – Olds (2010) 
Note. – Private interest rate: 個人; Public interest rate: 日本勸業銀行, 吳; Inflation was high in early 
1920s due to aftermaths of World War I. 
Figure 4. Value-added by Year in Finance Services in Korea 
(Unit: Thousand Yen) 
 
Source. – Joo (2005) 
Note. – Sub-total of valued added in finance services including special banks, commercial banks, oriental 
reclamation company, financial cooperative, moneylenders and pawnshops, stock exchange, trusts, 
other financial companies 
Figure 5. Rainfall 1770-1910 in Korea 
 
Source.–  Rhee (2009) 
Note.– 100% denotes the average rainfall from 1770 to 1990.  Drought is defined as 50% of the average 
rainfall from April to June.  Flood is defined as more than 200% of the average rainfall from July to 
September.  
Figure 6. Purpose of Loans 
 
Source. – Oh (1996) 
Note. – In order to prepare World War II, Japan focused on industrial investments in the late 1930s in 
Korea.
Figure 7. Decomposition of Collateral in Korea 
 
Source. – Oh (1996) 
Note. – Loans for industrial investments in the late 1930s were given without collateral because it was 
given for World War II preparation.   
 
 Figure 8. The number of boundaries to be identified 
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Figure 9. Costs and Benefits of Land Reforms 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. A comparison of land tenure systems 
Country Japan  
(1873) 
Korea  
(before 1918) 
Taiwan 
(before 1905) 
Ownership Single owner Single owner Multiple owner 
(sub-soil owner, top-soil 
owner) 
Land register Official registers 
(100% of land was 
registered) 
Official registers for tax 
(50% of land was 
registered) 
Official registers for tax 
(30% of land was 
registered) 
Updating system Yes; 
Registers were updated 
and connected to 
taxpayers 
No; 
Registers were 
outdated and not 
informative to indentify 
taxpayers 
No; 
Registers were 
outdated and not 
informative to indentify 
taxpayers 
Title Official titles;  
All titles were linked to 
a centralized system 
Official and private title; 
Private titles were not 
linked to a centralized 
system 
Official and private title; 
Private titles were not 
linked to a centralized 
system 
Boundary (map) Taiko survey (1590s); 
Cadastral survey (1873) 
Boundary was 
described vaguely 
based on landmarks 
Boundary was 
described vaguely 
based on landmarks 
Tax system Based on the value of 
land; 
Payable in money; 
Uniform tax rate 
Based on the size of the 
harvest; 
Payable in rice; 
Tax rate varied locally 
Based on the size of the 
harvest; 
Payable in rice 
      
Source. – Duus (1976), Lin (2008), Rhee et. al. (2004) 
 
 
Table 2. Disputed and undisputed cases in issuing land titles in Babeldaob 2000 – 2010 
 Disposed  Pending  Disposed + Pending  
Total 
 
% of Disputed Disputed Undisputed  Disputed Undisputed  Disputed Undisputed 
States with the Japanese land registers in Babeldaob island 
Ngchesar 17 50  16 29  33 79 112 29.5 
Ngaremlengui 11 14  2 7  13 21 34 38.2 
Ngarchelong 46 154  7 5  53 159 212 25.0 
Ngaraard 24 234  57 4  81 238 319 25.4 
Melekeok 5 15  7 3  12 18 30 40.0 
Total 103 467  89 48  192 515 707 27.2 
States without the Japanese land registers in Babeldaob island 
Airai 4 48  94 19  98 67 165 59.4 
Aimeliik 24 10  7 1  31 11 42 73.8 
Ngardmau 4 27  19 1  23 28 51 45.1 
Total 32 85  120 21  152 106 258 58.9 
Source. – Palau Land Court 
Note. – Two states that have fewer than five cases are excluded.
Table 3. Total amount of collateralized loan (collateral type: land) in Korea, 1918 – 1930 
 (Unit: 1,000 yen) 
 Collateralized (land) regular loan  Collateralized (land) Short-term loan 
Total 
Siksan Dongchuk Geumjo  Choeun Siksan Botong 
1918 6,621 11,371 1,253  5,049 3,320 6,590 34,204 
20 28,216 30,571 10,639  12,037 5,820 17,557 104,840 
22 61,326 37,927 18,128  19,438 12,426 28,164 177,407 
24 70,075 39,806 18,749  21,417 14,813 32,253 197,113 
26 83,817 35,609 25,518  17,003 15,520 36,033 213,600 
28 110,399 38,743 25,642  9,070 16,669 34,429 234,952 
30 140,120 44,430 38,076  20,538 8,996 46,423 298,583 
Source. – Hori (1982) 
Note. – 1) Siksan, Dongchuk, Geumjo, Choeun, and Botong are the names of financial institutions. 
2) The formal land survey was completed on November 1918. 
Table 4. Land transaction in Taiwan (Collateralization / Sales) 
Year Parcels of land registered as 
collateral in Taiwan 
Parcels of land registered as changing 
hands through sales in Taiwan 
1905 4848 4499 
1906 43731 51137 
1907 38040 62043 
1908 39798 64210 
1909 46279 68466 
1910 54474 74815 
1911 53718 86286 
1912 67335 151125 
1913 83341 121328 
1914 92130 93759 
Source. – Statistics on Land Registration in Taiwan (臺灣土地登記集計表) (1915) 
Note. – Registration began in July of 1905. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Former Japanese Colonies and British Colonies, Descriptive statistics
Country GDP INSTITUTION PACIFIC JAPANESE CITY LENGTH OF REVISED
per capita ISLAND LAND BRITISH LENGTH OF
($, PPP) SURVEY OCCUPATION BRITISH
in 2007 OCCUPATION
Bangladesh 1300 -0.84 0 0 0 172 44
Brunei 51000 0.47 0 0 0 93 86
Cambodia 1800 -1.10 0 0 0 0 0
Cook Islands 9100 0.84 1 0 0 83 81
Fiji 5500 -0.14 1 0 0 97 96
Hong Kong 42000 1.25 0 0 1 157 155
India 2700 0.12 0 0 0 191 44
Indonesia 3700 -0.79 0 0 0 5 0
Kiribati 3600 0.43 1 0 0 88 44
Laos 2100 -1.06 0 0 0 0 0
Macau 28400 0.67 0 0 1 0 0
Malaysia 13300 0.51 0 0 0 128 76
Marshall Islands 2900 -0.18 1 0 0 0 0
Federated States 
of Micornesia 2300 0.21 1 0 0 0 0
Myanmar 1900 -1.46 0 0 0 60 29
Nauru 5000 0.73 1 0 0 52 41
Pakistan 2600 -0.81 0 0 0 105 44
Palau 7600 0.64 1 1 0 0 0
Papua New Guinea 2000 -0.86 0 0 0 77 2
Philippines 3400 -0.45 0 0 0 2 0
Singapore 49700 1.68 0 0 1 141 134
Solomon Island 1900 -1.05 1 0 0 80 10
South Korea 24800 0.73 0 1 0 0 0
Sri Lanka 4100 0.02 0 0 0 153 39
Taiwan 30100 0.81 0 1 0 0 0
Timor Leste 2500 -0.97 0 0 0 0 0
Tonga 5100 0.15 1 0 0 71 54
Tubalu 1600 1.28 1 0 0 88 44
Vanuatu 3900 0.07 1 0 0 37.5 6
Vietnam 2600 -0.53 0 0 0 0 0
Thailand 8200 0.20 0 0 0 0 0
Source. - CIA World Factbook (2007), Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007)
Table 6. OLS and 2SLS regression
Dependent variable: LogGDP per capita
OLS 2SLS
instruments: LAND SURVEY LAND SURVEY LAND SURVEY
PACIFIC ISLAND PACIFIC ISLAND PACIFIC ISLAND
CITY REVISED LENGTH OF LENGTH OF BRITISH
BRITISH OCCUPATION OCCUPATION
INSTITUTION (B) 1.102** 1.449** 1.421** 1.122**
(S.E) (.149) (.228) (.222) (0.303)
PACIFIC ISLAND -.929** -1.064** -1.053** -.937**
(S.E) (.250) (.268) (.264) (.260)
Adj R-square 0.6534 - - -
Weak Instruments Tests
Shea Partial R-square in the 1st stage 0.4642 0.4766 0.2199
Anderson canonical correlation LM statistic 14.389 14.776 6.817
H0: Under-identified (p-value) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0331)
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 11.695 12.294 3.806
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 19.93 19.93 19.93
15% maximal IV size 11.59 11.59 11.59
20% maximal IV size 8.75 8.75 8.75
25% maximal IV size 7.25 7.25 7.25
Sargan statistic 0.243 0.311 2.36
H0: Instruments are vaild (p-value) (0.6223) (0.5770) (0.1245)
Number of observations 31 31 31
NOTE. - * p < .05;  ** p < .01
Table 7. First stage regression
Dependent variable: INSTITUTION (2a) (2b) (2c)
LAND SURVEY .978* 1.236** 1.126*
(.373) (.380) (.474)
PACIFIC ISLAND .650** 0.384 0.450
(.236) (.226) (.278)
CITY 1.669** - -
(.385) - -
REVISED LENGTH OF BRITISH OCCUPATION - 0.012** -
- (0.003) -
LENGTH OF BRITISH OCCUPATION - - 0.005*
- - (0.002)
R-squared 0.4835 0.5053 0.2626
Shea Partial R-square 0.4642 0.4776 0.2199
F statistics (partialed out) 11.69** 12.29** 3.81*
Number of observations 31 31 31
NOTE. - * p < .05;  ** p < .01
Appendix 1. Japanese Occuapation
Country JAPANESE OCCUPATION PERIOD BRITISH OCCUPATION PERIOD
Brunei 1941.12.22-1945.6.10 1888 - 1984
Cambodia 1945.3.9-1945.8.15; troop 1940.9.22-1945.8.15
China 1932-1945 (Manchuria)
Hong Kong 1941.12.25-1945.8.15 1841-1997
India 1945 (Andaman and Nicobar Islands) 1757-1947
Indonesia 1942.3.8-1945.8.17 1811-1816
Kiribati 1941.12.9-1943.11.23 1892-1979
Laos 1945.3.9-1945.8.15; troop 1940.9.22-1945.8.15
Macau 1943.8-1945.8.14 
Malaysia 1942.1.31-1945.9.11 1826-1957
Marshall Islands 1914.10.3-1944.2
Micornesia 1914.10.7-1944.2
Myanmar 1942.8.1-1945.5.3 1886-1948
Nauru 1942.8.26-1045.9.13 1914-1920
Palau 1914.10.8-1944.10.11
Papua New Guinea 1942.1.21-1944.8 1914-1921
Philippines 1942.1.2-1945.10.14 1762-1763
Russia 1918-1927 (Sakhalin)
Singapore 1942.2.15-1945.9.11 1819-1963
South Korea 1910.8.29-1945.8.15
Taiwan 1895.5.8-1945.10.25
Timor Leste 1942.2.20-1945.9.11
Tubalu 1941.12.9-1943.11.23 (not occupied) 1892-1979
Vietnam 1945.3.9-1945.8.15; troop 1940.9.22-1945.8.15
Note. - Kiribati and Tubalu were the same country (Gilbert and Ellice Islands) in the 1940s.  Japan did not occupied Ellice Islands (Tubalu) 
Appendex 2. British occupation dates and the year of introducing the British land tenure system
Country Date (BRITAIN) Year Law, Survey, or Committee
Brunei 1888 - 1984; autonomy 1959 1909 The Land Code
Saunders (1994), A History of Brunei, p.114-115
Cook Islands 1888-1900 1891 To settle disputes about Land (Aitutaki) - IC. 
Crocombe (1964), Land Tenure in the Cook Islands
Fiji 1874-1970 1876 The Real Property Ordinance (Torrens Systems)
http://www.cadastraltemplate.org/fielddata/a4.htm 1875 The very first Department of Lands and Immigration was established
Hong Kong 1841-1997 1844 The Land Registration Ordinance
http://www.cadastraltemplate.org/fielddata/a4.htm
India 1757-1947 1904 The recommendation of the 1904 Committee of Govt.
Mishra, Cadastral surveys in India: A critique; http://www.gisdevelopment.net/application/lis/policy/lisp0001.htm
Kiribati 1892-1979; 1877 British jurisdiction 1936 The first Lands Commission
From Tuvalu; Kiribati and Tuvalu were the same country until 1975
Malaysia 1826-1957 1879 Introduction of the Torrens system
http://www.cadastraltemplate.org/fielddata/a4.htm
Myanmar 1886-1948 1907 The Settlement and Land Records Department
http://mission.itu.ch/MISSIONS/Myanmar/e-com/Agri/expind/agri-index/myanmar.com/Ministry/agriculture/Organi/slrd.htm
Nauru 1914-1920; 1921-1968 Australia 1928 The Nauru Lands Committee; Given legislative backing in 1956
MacSporran (1995), Land Ownership and Control in Nauru
Papua New Guinea 1884-1906; 1906-1971 Australria 1969 Surveying Ordinance
3rd FIG Regional Conference for Asia and the Pacific; http://www.fig.net/pub/jakarta/programme.htm
Curley and Boydell (2004), The Regulation, Registration and Representation of Surveyors in the Pacific Islands Countries 
Singapore 1819-1963 1826 English statutes in force
Phang (2000), Hong Kong and Singapore
Solomon Island 1893-1978 1969 The Land and Titles Act 
Sullivan (2007), Recognition of Customary Land in the Solomon Islands
Sri lanka 1796-1948 1910 village plans
http://www.cadastraltemplate.org/fielddata/a4.htm
Tonga 1900-1970 1927 An Act Relating To Land
Seminar on “Good Governance in Land Tenure and Administration”, Country Report Tonga; http://www.usp.ac.fj/index.php?id=7061
Tuvalau 1892-1979 1936 The first Lands Commission
Seminar on “Good Governance in Land Tenure and Administration”, Country Report Tuvalu; http://www.usp.ac.fj/index.php?id=7061
Vanuatu 1906-1980 1974 A Land Trust Board
Burlo (1989), Land Alienation, Land Tenure, and Tourism in Vanuatu
